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Violating International Law Is Contagious
Shai Dothan*

Abstract
Democracies have a stronger incentive to comply with international law than autocracies,
but they will not comply when faced with violations by other states. International law is a
mechanism of cooperation between states: it can make states vulnerable to betrayal, but also
increase their chances for successful collaboration. In other words, complying with international
law is like playing cooperate in a stag hunt game. Cooperating is an efficient strategy but not a
strategy that is evolutionarily stable. If an autocracy emerges and starts to violate international
law, democracies will violate international law in response. This makes violating international
law contagious. However, because democracies fare better than autocracies even when they break
international law, a democratic regime type can also be contagious in some settings.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Tom Ginsburg’s book Democracies and International Law1 demonstrates that
democracies use international law as a mechanism of cooperation much more than
autocracies. Democracies sign more treaties than autocracies.2 Democracies file
more cases in the International Court of Justice (ICJ),3 International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea (ITLOS),4 and the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute
Settlement System.5 International organizations composed mostly of democracies
have more precise obligations in their charters.6 Even countries that shift between
democratic and nondemocratic governments are more likely to sign treaties when
they are democratic.7
These and other observations about the greater propensity of democracies
to apply international law are explained in the book by several possible theories.8
The most intuitive theory calls attention to the different time horizons of
democracies and autocracies.9 Democracies behave as if they consider not just the
survival of a specific government, but the success of the entire regime. While
autocratic leaders care mostly about staying in power and can expect severe
personal repercussions if they lose their position in government, democratic
leaders care about the future prosperity of their country and may even want to use
international law to bind future governments to policies they believe in.10 When
future benefits are not heavily discounted, assuming international law obligations
becomes a more profitable strategy.
After states accept an international law obligation, their decision of whether
to comply with this obligation is also directly connected to how they discount
future benefits. Compliance with international law signals that the state cares
about the future and is willing to suffer immediate costs in order to gain from its
future position in the international community. States that comply with their
international obligations accumulate reputations that assure future partners that
the state will not betray these partners for quick gains.11 The higher the state’s
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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11

TOM GINSBURG, DEMOCRACIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2021).
See id. at 62–68.
See id. at 88–90.
See id. at 91–92.
See id. at 92.
See id. at 100.
See id. at 78.
See id. at 39–45.
See id. at 39–41.
See id.
See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS – A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 33–
36 (2008).
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reputation, the stronger its incentive to avoid international law violations, because
each violation would lead to an extreme downward adjustment of its reputation
in the eyes of the international community.12
The wish to maintain a high reputation therefore operates as an incentive
that motivates states to comply with international law. This incentive is stronger
for democracies compared to autocracies because democracies care more about
future benefits.13 Autocracies care less about long-term costs, which makes
noncompliance often the best solution for them because it can serve the survival
of their leaders even if it damages their future reputations. Autocracies will
therefore often choose not to comply even when they face other states that
comply with international law. In contrast, democracies will not comply with their
international obligations primarily when they are faced with noncompliance by
other states. Much of international law relies on reciprocal concessions, making
compliance an inferior strategy for a state that interacts with lawbreakers.14
Section II explains that, for democracies, compliance with international law
therefore resembles cooperating (“playing cooperate”) in a stag hunt game: it is
the best strategy if other states comply as well, but it is inefficient if other states
violate the law. In a group of democracies that comply with international law,
every state has an incentive to comply with international law as well. In this ideal
situation, compliance is a strategy that is beneficial both for the individual state
and for the group.
Section III argues that while compliance with international law maximizes
the benefits of everyone when practiced by the entire group, it is not an
evolutionarily stable strategy. If the group of compliant democracies is infiltrated
by an autocracy that violates international law, democracies will have an incentive
to violate their legal obligations as well. Just like players of stag hunt that are faced
with defection, democracies will start to defect by violating international law.
Soon, this strategy will spread from democracy to democracy because democracies
will choose noncompliance even in their interactions with one another.
Section IV mitigates this grim prediction. It relies on Ginsburg’s book to
demonstrate the advantages that democracies have over autocracies, even in cases
of prevalent noncompliance with international law. If democracy is superior, it
can spread from state to state as autocracies try to improve their fate by regime
change.

13

See id. at 38-40; Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law,
72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 510 (2005); SHAI DOTHAN, REPUTATION AND JUDICIAL TACTICS: A THEORY
OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS 13 (2015); Shai Dothan, A Virtual Wall of Shame: The
New Way of Imposing Reputational Sanctions on Defiant States, 27 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 141, 188
(2017) (providing empirical support for this observation).
See GINSBURG, supra note 1, at 39–41.

14

See GUZMAN, supra note 11, at 42.
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Section V, in contrast, calls such a positive development into question in
light of recent forms of populist movements and what Ginsburg’s book calls
“authoritarian international law.”
Section VI concludes.

II. DEMOCRACIES COOPERATE BETTER WITH OTHER DEMOCRACIES
The stag hunt game is a simple game theoretical depiction of many situations
in life. The story behind the game clarifies the strategic incentives it entails. Two
hunters are trying to catch a stag together. Subduing the stag requires cooperation;
it cannot be performed by one hunter. Therefore, if one of the hunters decides to
betray his partner—who remains committed to hunting the stag—and goes after
a hare instead, he will catch that hare, but the partner will be left with nothing. If
both partners choose to defect, they can both succeed to hunt hares. A stag
divided between the hunters provides superior nutrition to the hares each hunter
can hunt on their own.
It is easy to see that for anybody taking part in this game, the proper strategy
depends on the expected strategy of their partner. If the partner is expected to
defect, defection is the proper strategy: it is better to catch a hare than to go home
empty-handed. If the partner is expected to cooperate, cooperating and hunting
the stag can yield the maximum profit.15
International law helps states coordinate their actions. In many situations, it
puts countries in conditions that resemble a stag hunt game. For example, if two
countries agree to build a factory together, they will usually be better off if they
cooperate to build the factory than if they refuse to do so. Assume that the factory
can only be completed if both countries work together. If a country suspects its
partner will not do its share in building the factory, the country will likely violate
its obligations as well to avoid paying the costs of a partial construction without
receiving any benefit. The same logic applies in more complicated settings such as
the sharing of natural resources among states.16 Adding multiple actors or some
level of uncertainty regarding the outcomes of cooperation should not change the
general nature of the game.
Generally, independent states would not enter an agreement unless it makes
them better off. In conditions of long-term cooperation, it is usually impossible
to continuously secure investments from others and shirk your own obligations.
Consequently, states can improve their situation for the long-term by signing an
agreement and complying with it. Any attempt to break the agreement may allow
15

In this respect, the stag hunt game differs from the prisoner’s dilemma game. In the prisoner’s
dilemma game, defection is a dominant strategy, which means both parties have an incentive to
defect regardless of what the other party does.

16

See Eyal Benvenisti, Collective Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The Challenges of International
Water Resources Law, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 384, 390 (1996).
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a country to extract some short-term gain, but the lost cooperation on the project
would lead to a long-term loss. Furthermore, noncompliance would result in a
damage to the state’s reputation, which would harm its ability to secure good deals
in the future, constituting an additional long-term cost. Therefore, when the long
term is considered, the proper strategy is to cooperate when one is interacting with
other cooperators, forming a stag hunt game.
Ginsburg’s book suggests that democracies are more likely to comply with
international law than autocracies. The longer time horizons and lower discount
rates of democracies allow them to see beyond the immediate costs of cooperation
and into the benefits associated with compliance in the future: sustained
collaboration and a high reputation. If a democracy collaborates with another
democracy on an international project, both have a strong incentive to comply
with their international obligations conditioned on the other state doing the same.
Because both states expect each other to comply, both states will choose
compliance over noncompliance.17
In a world populated by democracies, international deals will be kept and
everybody will get to hunt the stag. International prosperity will carry on unabated
and peace will come to all. This is the ideal world that Ginsburg’s book refers to
as reflecting a modern version of Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace.18 Democracies
in this utopian world will not only abolish war but will also comply with all their
international obligations to the benefit of all states. As long as this perpetual peace
can be maintained, it is the most efficient state of affairs because all states will end
up earning the maximum payoffs.

III. INTERNATIONAL LAW COMPLIANCE IS NOT EVOLUTIONARY STABLE
A world populated by democracies that comply with international law is the
most efficient for everyone concerned. But the most efficient strategy is not
necessarily the most stable one. The stag hunt modeling of inter-state interactions
clarifies why.
Playing cooperate in the stag hunt game is the best strategy when one meets
another actor who plays cooperate. If one expects to meet actors who play defect,
defection is a better strategy. This means that playing cooperate is a good strategy
only below a certain threshold of probability of meeting actors that play defect.
When defection spreads in the group and that threshold is crossed, playing defect
performs better.

17

See Uri Weiss & Joseph Agassi, Game Theory for International Accords, 16 S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 12
(2020) (explaining that even if an international agreement is not enforceable, if it generates an
expectation of compliance, it can lead to cooperation in the stag hunt game).

18

See GINSBURG, supra note 1, at 31–33.
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In an experiment in which a community of hunters are paired randomly with
partners from a certain pool who have some risk of mutation between cooperators
and defectors, there are dire prospects for the evolutionary stability of playing
cooperate. If the penalty for being mismatched with a defector and playing
cooperate exceeds the benefit from playing cooperate when matched with a
cooperator, players will switch more easily from being cooperators to being
defectors, rather than the other way around. In other words, the threshold for
becoming defectors will be lower than the threshold for becoming cooperators.19
Tragically, small differences in the height of the threshold for becoming
defectors can translate to enormous differences in the stability of sustaining a
community of cooperators. If a small number of simultaneous mutations of
cooperators to defectors suffices for passing the threshold, the probability that
such a shift will occur will be very high. The perfect solution of everybody hunting
stags together will not last for long. Everyone will soon switch to hunting hares.20
Returning to states and their propensity to comply with international law,
the implications are clear and unfortunate. Even starting from an ideal condition
in which all states are democracies and all comply with international law because
of their low discount rates, there is always the possibility of democracies
backsliding and becoming autocracies. Ginsburg’s book documents many
instances of states shifting back and forth between democracy and autocracy21
suggesting that such mutation is inevitable.
Autocracies will find it useful to violate international law even when
interacting with law-abiding states because their high discount rates and short time
horizons make them focus on the costs of compliance more than the rewards it
brings later on. The rewards of compliance—long-term collaboration and
maintaining a high reputation—are often not potent enough incentives to
convince autocracies to comply with international law. In other words, an
autocracy could choose to defect even if it expects its partner to play
“cooperate.”22 If autocracies violate international law, democracies that interact
with them will have an incentive to violate their international commitments as well
to avoid getting the sucker payoff.
When democracies start to break international law, especially in multilateral
areas of international cooperation, the implications will be felt not just by the
19

20
21
22

See Paul G. Mahoney & Chris W. Sanchirico, Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm
Efficient?, U. PA. L. REV. 2027, 2047 (2001).
See id. at 2048.
See GINSBURG, supra note 1, at 76–78.
One can say that autocracies are playing a prisoner’s dilemma game instead of a stag hunt game
because their strategic response to cooperation is defection. See Uri Weiss & Joseph Agassi, The
Game Theory of the European Union Versus the Pax Romana, 70 DEPAUL L. REV. 551, 559 (2021)
(explaining the usefulness of transitioning from a prisoner’s dilemma game to a stag hunt game, a
change that occurred when European states founded the European Union).
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autocracies that violated their obligations first, but also by other democracies. As
a result, if democracies start to violate international law, other democracies that
interact with these initial violators will violate international law as well because
keeping their obligations when paired with a lawbreaker is the worst policy.
Noncompliance with international law will spread like wildfire even among
democracies.
Game theory literature suggests that pessimism about the stability of
efficient behavior in the stag hunt game is not always warranted. If actors can
leave a misbehaving community and migrate elsewhere, the evolutionary
instability of playing cooperate can be mitigated.23 This instability can also be
prevented if a proper system of punishing defectors and compensating their
victims is in place.24 Too bad for law-abiding states! No state can detach itself
from its place on the globe or completely stop interacting with its neighbors. An
effective system of punishing international law violators is unrealistic in a world
of independent sovereign states. The spiral of noncompliance with international
law is likely to remain unchecked.

IV. DEMOCRATIC WAVES
As Ginsburg makes clear in his book, democracy is not a guarantee of
compliance with international law.25 But this Essay suggests that the crux of the
problem of noncompliance starts with the interaction of democracies and
autocracies. If the stag hunt modelling is correct, democracies that expect
compliance from their interlocutors will tend to comply with international law as
well. Autocracies, in contrast, will fail to comply even when they expect
compliance from others, and their violations of international law will tend to
spread because violations create distrust among all states, including democracies.
The prevalence of noncompliance with international law in the global arena
is expected to push democracies towards noncompliance. It would not, however,
make democracies abandon their regimes and become autocracies. Ginsburg’s
book cites evidence that democracies do not go to war against other democracies,
but they have no qualms about fighting against autocracies. 26 Furthermore, when
democracies fight against autocracies, they usually win.27 Being a democracy
therefore puts states in a superior position compared to autocracies. Democracies
can enjoy peace with their fellow democracies even when they violate their
international obligations. If, after careful consideration, they decide that war with

26

See Mahoney & Sanchirico, supra note 19, at 2048–51.
See id. at 2058–62.
See GINSBURG, supra note 1, at 34.
See id. at 31–32.

27

See id.
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an autocracy serves their interests, they can beat that autocracy on the battlefield
with little concern for the rules that they break along the way.
As long as there are autocracies, noncompliance with international law can
emerge and proliferate. But if the presence of autocracies is minimized, it is
possible that democracies will be able to maintain an equilibrium of cooperation—
they can comply with international law and get the optimal benefit of catching a
stag. Compliance will occur if the probability of facing cooperate from other states
is high enough to make cooperate the better strategy for democracies. Even if
some autocracies are likely to maintain their regime type and even if democratic
backsliding cannot be prevented, it is still possible that an increase in the
proportion of democratic to autocratic states will push democracies towards fewer
international law violations.
Ginsburg’s book mentions the series of democratic transitions in Georgia,
Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan following the color revolutions in the early 2000s.28 This
is just the tip of the iceberg of a global phenomenon of so-called “democratic
waves” that has recurred over the last two centuries.29 A single autocracy may
become a democracy because democracy leads to superior results. But waves of
democratization probably occur because a shift to democracy in one country can
increase the chances that other countries will shift to democracy as well.
The mechanisms that make democratic shifts contagious are probably varied
and complicated.30 In light of the analysis conducted so far, it is possible to
hypothesize one such mechanism: when the ratio of democracies to autocracies
increases, becoming a democracy grows increasingly more profitable due to the
prospects of greater cooperation with other democracies. A democracy that is
surrounded by democracies can expect peaceful international relations and a
greater chance that its efforts to comply with its international obligations would
be reciprocated by its neighbors. With every democracy that is born, democratic
shifts become more tempting and create a realistic possibility of sharing stags
instead of hares.
To recap, while international law violations are contagious, autocracy is not.
Moreover, given the proper conditions, democracy can become contagious. If
enough states become democratic, an equilibrium in which compliance with
international law is the norm can potentially be reached. Such an equilibrium may
be precarious and unstable, but it is not unattainable.

29

See id. at 28–29.
See Seva Gunitsky, Democratic Waves in Historical Perspective, 16 PERSPS. POL. 634, 634 (2018).

30

See id. at 636–43.

28
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V. ARE DEMOCRATIC WAVES STILL LIKELY TODAY?
The prospect of democratic waves makes the news about the evolutionary
instability of equilibriums of international law compliance a little less bleak. But
democratic waves are likely to happen, at least according to the analysis in this
Essay, because autocracies need them to improve their chances of international
cooperation. Two recent developments discussed in Ginsburg’s book suggest that
autocracies can now reach at least some level of cooperation without a regime
change, obviating their incentive to democratize.
The first development is what Ginsburg calls “authoritarian international
law.” This is the Pepsi Max version of international law: Maximum Cooperation,
No Sovereignty Loss.31 Autocracies realized that by using existing international
law institutions and taking away all the real constraints that these institutions imply
on the flexibility and discretion of state behavior, autocracies are able to
coordinate their actions well with one another without giving up any of their
individual interests.32
Cooperation between autocracies is always going to be fragile because the
flexibility that autocracies preserve comes at the cost of minimal commitment.
This means that cooperation can be successful at times but will break down
quickly when conflicts arise.33 Nevertheless, absent such conflicts, authoritarian
international law may thrive, and autocracies will have no need to convert to
democracy in order to improve their ability to cooperate on the international
arena.
The second development is the rise of authoritarian populist movements
around the world. Populism is committed to the thesis that the pure and healthy
majority of the people is threatened by a corrupt elite that is usually depicted as
selling out the pubic to external forces.34 The hostility of populist regimes to
international law and potent international institutions is therefore only natural. It
is likely to corrode the commitment of many countries to comply with
international law, while giving others an incentive to violate international law for
spite, just to curry favor with their constituents.35
Ginsburg shows that populist leaders such as Donald Trump, Viktor Orbán,
and Jaroslaw Kaczyński tend to support each other, as do populist regimes in
South America.36 The great fighters against external influence become very
friendly when sitting around the “council of evil” table. For those who feel

35

The original slogan is “Maximum Taste, No Sugar.”
See GINSBURG, supra note 1, at 234–36.
See id. at 205–07, 235–36.
See id. at 123; Cas Mudde, The Populist Zeitgeist, 39 GOV’T. & OPPOSITION 541, 543 (2004).
See GINSBURG, supra note 1, at 122–23
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See id.
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threatened by the traditional institutions of international law, coalition-building
with other states in the same predicament is an existential need. Once again, recent
conditions provide autocracies with incentives that allow them to cooperate
without democratization.

VI. CONCLUSION
Compliance rates with international law can potentially be held in a sort of
dynamic equilibrium because of the countervailing forces of two vectors: (1)
international law violations are contagious because they make democracies worry
that their compliance will not be reciprocated; and (2) democracy is contagious
because democracies are better able to cooperate with one another than
autocracies, including through compliance with international law.
There is no guarantee that both vectors will have the same impact in any set
of circumstances. In fact, the possibilities afforded by authoritarian international
law and collaboration between authoritarian populists may weaken the second
vector, tilting the balance in favor of growing noncompliance with international
law.
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